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5 July 1966

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## INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

IMPORTANT SESSION OF SUPREME SOVIET SET FOR 2 AUGUST

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

GROUP 1  
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
5 July 1966

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM\*

Important Session of  
Supreme Soviet Set for 2 August

1. A Supreme Soviet session set for 2 August has resulted in changes on short notice in the travel plans of Premier Kosygin, Deputy Premier Polyansky, and Foreign Minister Gromyko.

2. Soviet explanations of these changes have referred to "urgent and unexpected" developments which will require the presence in Moscow of Kosygin and Polyansky from mid-July onward. These unidentified developments, while obviously important, do not appear to involve an imminent crisis. A party central committee plenum may conceivably be held in mid-July to lay the groundwork for the August Supreme Soviet session. The plenum, if held, may provide further clues as to the nature of these problems. The fragmentary evidence available thus far suggests that the problems may be domestic rather than foreign policy ones.

3. On 24 June TASS announced that Kosygin's state visit to Sweden, already postponed once and rescheduled for 18 to about 24 July, had been postponed indefinitely because of "unforeseen circumstances."

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\*Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.

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5. Kosygin and Polyansky are both full members of the politburo, and the regime's emphasis on "collective leadership" would make their attendance at a central committee plenum almost mandatory. A further hint that a plenum might be set for mid-July was provided on 25 June by Ambassador Dobrynin--a member of the central committee--when he revealed that he was likely to return to the USSR on 12 July, the same day Polyansky is scheduled to return.

6. The announcement of the convening of the Supreme Soviet was carried in the 25 June Izvestia, the same issue which reported the postponement of Kosygin's visit to Sweden. During this period, Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Japan was advanced from 29 July-5 August to 24-30 July, with the explanation that he had to be in Moscow for the Supreme Soviet meeting on 2 August.

7. A West German news item of 2 July noted the postponement "until autumn" of Soviet - West German trade talks which had been scheduled to begin in Bonn on 13 July, a date only recently set. The Soviet negotiators had not been named, but they would perforce have been drawn from the state economic apparatus. It is this group, and not the foreign minister, whose presence in Moscow appears to be essential during July.

8. Several official foreign visits to Moscow are still scheduled for this period. These could presumably be carried out during a plenum and while preparations for the Supreme Soviet sessions were in progress. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is to visit Moscow from 12 to 16 July, and UN Secretary General Thant is to be there from 25 to 28 July. Iraqi Prime Minister al-Bazzaz is to arrive on 27 July.

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9. It is not now apparent why the Supreme Soviet session has been set--so inconveniently early--for 2 August. Nor is it known why this session should demand such extensive preparatory work by Kosygin and presumably Polyansky.

10. A new Supreme Soviet was elected on 12 June and according to the USSR Constitution has until 12 September to form a new government--usually a pro forma matter not likely to require Kosygin's close attention. Agendas of sessions are not announced in advance but are published only after the session has opened. It is not known, therefore, what other business may be taken up.

11. The evidence suggests domestic issues. One possibility is consideration of the five-year plan. Kosygin stated in his concluding speech to the 23rd Party Congress in April that the five-year plan based on the draft directives with target figures for each year must be worked out within four to five months and then submitted to the Supreme Soviet for consideration.

12. The Supreme Soviet does not normally endorse long-term plans, but it may act on the pending five-year plan as part of the regime's announced intention to involve the Supreme Soviet more closely in governmental activities.

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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

MEMO NO.: **1682/66**

SUBJECT: **Important Session of the <sup>Supreme</sup> Soviet  
Set for 2 August**

REQUESTED OR ORIGINATED BY: **D/OCI**

DISSEMINATION: **Routine internal and external**

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
THROUGH : Deputy Director for Intelligence  
FROM : Director, Office of Current Intelligence  
SUBJECT : Important Session of Supreme Soviet  
Set for 3 August

1. A Supreme Soviet session set for 3 August has resulted in changes on short notice in the travel plans of Premier Konygin, Deputy Premier Polyan sky, and Foreign Minister Gromyko.

2. Soviet explanations of these changes have referred to "urgent and unexpected" developments which will require the presence in Moscow of Konygin and Polyan sky from mid-July onward. These unidentified developments, while obviously important, do not appear to involve an imminent crisis. A party central committee plenum may conceivably be held in mid-July to lay the groundwork for the August Supreme Soviet session. The plenum, if held, may provide us with further clues as to the nature of these problems. The fragmentary evidence available thus far suggests that the problems may be domestic rather than foreign policy ones.

3. On 24 June TASS announced that Konygin's state visit to Sweden, already postponed once and rescheduled for 18 to about 24 July, had been postponed indefinitely because of "unforeseen circumstances."

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5. Kosygin and Polyansky are both full members of the politburo, and the regime's emphasis on "collective leadership" would make their attendance at a central committee plenum almost mandatory. A further hint that a plenum might be set for mid-July was provided by Ambassador Dobrynin--a member of the central committee--on 26 June when he revealed that he was likely to return to the USSR on 11 July, the same day Polyansky is scheduled to return.

6. The announcement of the convening of the Supreme Soviet was carried in the 18 June Investiga, the same issue which reported the postponement of Kosygin's visit to Sweden. During this period, Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to Japan was advanced from 20 July-6 August to 24-30 July, with the explanation that he had to be in Moscow for the Supreme Soviet meeting on 3 August.

7. A West German news item of 2 July noted the postponement "until autumn" of Soviet - West German trade talks which had been scheduled to begin in Bonn on 13 July, a date only recently set. The Soviet negotiators had not been named, but they would probably have been drawn from the state economic apparatus. It is this group, and not the foreign minister, whose presence in Moscow appears to be essential during July.

8. Several official foreign visitors to Moscow are still scheduled for this period. Their visits could presumably be carried out during a plenum and while preparations for the Supreme Soviet session were in progress. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is to visit Moscow from 12 to 16 July, and UN Secretary General Thant is to be there from 26 to 28 July. Iraqi Prime Minister al-Ba'asir is to arrive on 27 July.

9. We are not able at this time to answer the question of why the Supreme Soviet session has been set--apparently so inconveniently early--for 3 August. Nor do we know why it should demand such extensive preparatory work by Kosygin and presumably Polyansky.

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